

# INFORMATION WEEKLY

## FOUNDER

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November 1st

Washington had to halt  
unconditionally all bombard-  
ments against the D.R.V.N.

## PRESIDENT HO CHI MINH APPEALS TO THE NATION

Fellow-countrymen and fighters  
all over the country,

**U**NDER the impact of the great  
victories won by our armed  
forces and people in both zones,  
especially in the South since early  
spring this year, the United States  
government was forced on Nov. 1st,  
1968 to end unconditionally its bomb-  
ing and shelling on the whole terri-  
tory of the Democratic Republic of  
Viet Nam.

Indeed, four years of incredibly  
heroic fighting of our armed forces  
and people have yielded tremendous  
results: more than 3,200 aircraft shot  
down, hundreds of war vessels, big  
and small, set afire, the U.S. war of  
destruction against the North of our  
country brought to naught.

It is a victory of very momentous  
significance for our people's great  
resistance against American aggression,  
for national salvation.

The American imperialists had  
mistakenly expected that with the  
sausage destructive power of bombs and  
shells, they would be able to weaken  
the North, prevent the flow of support  
from the great rear to the great front  
and impair the fighting strength of the  
South. But in fact, in the course of  
the North's fight against the American  
aggressor, its all-round strength has  
never ceased growing nor its un-  
wholehearted assistance to the liberation  
struggle of their valiant Southern  
fellow-countrymen. Similarly, our  
Southern Kith-and-kin's unity, and  
fores and successes have been increas-  
ing at the same rate as the intensity  
of their struggle against U.S. aggres-  
sion.

Our achievement can be ascribed to  
our Party's sound revolutionary  
line, our people's patriotism, the  
strength of their oneness and determi-  
nation to win, and the fine socialist  
regime. It goes to the common credit  
of our armed forces and people in  
both zones, South and North. It is  
also a victory won by the people of  
the brother socialist countries and our  
friends on the five continents.

On this occasion, on behalf of the  
Party and the Government, I warmly  
praise our fellow-countrymen and  
fighters all over the country, and  
sincerely thank the brother socialist  
countries, friendly countries far and  
near and the world peoples, including  
the progressives in the U.S.A., for  
their great help and for their sympathy  
and support.

Dear fellow-countrymen and fight-  
ers,

**W**E have defeated the war of  
destruction of the American  
imperialists in the North.  
But this is only an initial victory.  
The American imperialists are very  
obdurate and perfidious. They talk of  
"peace" and "negotiations" but still  
nurture dark aggressive designs. More  
than a million American, puppet and  
satellite troops are still daily commit-  
ting untold crimes against our Southern  
compatriots.

Therefore, the sacred duty of our  
entire people at present is to stiffen  
our determination to fight and win,  
our resolve to liberate the South,  
defend the North and achieve ulti-  
mate peaceful national reunification.

(Continued page 2)

## STATEMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM

**O**VER the past 14 years, in  
disregard of its pledge con-  
cerning the Geneva Agreements  
on Viet Nam, the United  
States has been ceaselessly inter-  
vening in, and pursuing an aggression  
against, the southern part of Viet  
Nam in an attempt to turn it into a  
U.S. neo-colony and military base  
and to prolong the partition of Viet  
Nam. Since the beginning of 1965, it  
has committed a U.S. expeditionary  
corps and satellite troops to South  
Viet Nam to step up the war of  
aggression there; at the same time  
it has carried out air and naval  
bombardments against the Demo-  
cratic Republic of Viet Nam in the  
hope of reversing its losing position,  
extricating itself from the South  
Viet Nam quagmire and subduing the  
Vietnamese people.

Under the clearest leadership  
of the South Viet Nam National  
Front for Liberation, our Southern  
compatriots have been fighting with  
extraordinary gallantry, inflicting  
heavy failures on the enemy, winning  
ever greater victories, especially since  
the general offensives and simultane-  
ous uprisings of Spring 1968, and  
have driven the U.S. imperialists  
deep into a passive and defensive  
position, and shaken to its founda-  
tions the puppet administration and  
army.

The North Vietnamese people have  
put up a heroic resistance against the  
war of destruction waged by the  
U.S. imperialists, prevented them from  
attaining its objectives and caused  
them very serious setbacks and the

loss of over 3,200 modern aircraft.  
In the midst of war, the Democratic  
Republic of Viet Nam has not ceased  
growing up, her economic and mili-  
tary potentials have been constantly  
strengthened, and national unity has  
become more solid than ever.

The fraternal socialist countries,  
the peace-loving peoples in the world  
and progressives in the United States,  
standing on the side of justice, have  
been resolutely supporting the Viet-  
namese people against the aggression  
of the U.S. imperialists, which has  
aggravated the latter's isolation.

Confronted with a desperate situa-  
tion in Viet Nam and tremendous  
difficulties arising from the Viet  
Nam war, and under the pressure  
of world and American opinion, the  
U.S. Government has been forced to  
announce a total cessation of air,  
naval and artillery bombardments  
against the Democratic Republic of  
Viet Nam.

The fact that the United States  
has had to unconditionally stop the  
bombardments on the entire terri-  
tory of the Democratic Republic of  
Viet Nam after piling up in four  
years monstrous crimes against the  
Northern people, and after blocking  
the progress of the Paris conversa-  
tions for five months constitutes a  
great victory of the Vietnamese  
people in both zones. It is also a  
great victory of the socialist camp,  
the national liberation movement  
and the peace movement, a great  
victory of the peoples throughout

(Continued page 2)

## BIG VICTORY, HEAVY AND GLORIOUS TASKS

Nhan Dan's editorial — Nov. 3, 1968

**A**FTER 14 heroic and  
victorious years the  
Vietnamese people's  
struggle against U.S.  
aggression, for national  
salvation, has entered a new  
period beginning with the  
general offensives and wide-  
spread uprisings on Jan. 30,  
1968. Since then, fired by  
new motive, our valiant great  
front has recorded still greater  
all-round victories.

In perfect coordination  
with the South Viet Nam  
Liberation forces and people,  
the Northern armed forces  
and people have fought with  
great efficiency and constant  
success, raising the total of  
U.S. aircraft shot down over  
North Viet Nam to over 3,200.

During nearly six months  
of official talks with the U.S.  
side in Paris, the voice of

justice and the reasonable  
position of the D.R.V.N.  
Government have been brought  
out in fuller relief and have  
won active support from  
progressive public opinion in  
the world.

In stubbornly keeping up  
its war of aggression and  
destruction, the U.S. has  
sustained bitter defeats in  
Viet Nam. Moreover, it has  
met with very serious diffi-  
culties in both its "global  
strategy" and home policy.  
In the world, the U.S. had  
become increasingly isolated.  
At home, the U.S. ruling  
circles have bumped against  
enormous difficulties arising  
from a financial and economic  
crisis as well as disturbances  
caused by lack of order and  
security, and racial discrimi-  
nation.

(Continued page 3)

## South Viet Nam

\* PUPPET ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICES  
IN SAIGON, HUE, MY THO, TAN SON  
NHAT AIRBASE AND FUEL TANKS AT  
NHA BE POUNDED ON NOVEMBER 1.

\* 5,500 Men Put out of Action, 80 Vehicles, 42 Helicopters,  
36 Ships and Launches Destroyed, Downed, Sunk or  
Damaged in 25 Provinces, from October 1 to 20.

\* An LST with 400 Men Aboard,  
Blown Up at My Tho.

\* Guerillas' Fresh Successes in Ben  
Tre, Tay Ninh and Thua Thien.

\* 300 Enemy Casualties in Con Tien  
Region.

Up to Nov. 1st, 1968

**3,243**  
U.S. aircraft were downed  
in North Viet Nam

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# PRESIDENT JOHNSON APPEALS TO THE NATION

(Continued from page 1)

So long as a single aggressor remains on our soil, we must continue our fight and urge you out.

Let our gallant Southern people and fighters, under the glorious banner of the South Viet Nam National Front for Liberation, state uninterrupted offenses and uprisings and resolutely advance towards complete victory.

Let the Northern armed forces in patriotic emulation to build socialism and fulfill their duty towards their Southern kith-and-kin, constantly sharpen their watchfulness, practice self-reliance, increase their strength and preparedness and frustrate all new schemes of the enemy.

We are confident that our people's resistance to American aggression, for national salvation, will exist ever growing sympathy, support and help from the peoples of the brother countries and all over the world, including progressive Americans.

After nearly a hundred years under the yoke of colonial servitude and more than twenty years of resistance against imperialist aggressive forces, our people more than any other people, are deeply and heartily convinced that it is badly needed for national construction. But this must be genuine peace in independence and freedom.

That is why we insist with firmness

## Paris Talks' 28th Session

THE 28th session of the official conversations between the D.R.V.N. Government's representative and the U.S. government's representative was held in Paris on Oct. 30.

Taking the floor first, U.S. envoy Mr. Harriman reiterated U.S. backed peace, peace profession and again invoked the so-called "Johnson-Thieu joint communique" of July 1968, which, as rightly pointed out by public opinion, actually serves U.S. neo-colonialist purposes in South Viet Nam and U.S. attempt to prolong the partition of Viet Nam.

In his speech, Minister of State Xuan Thuy said:

"Though the Paris official conversations have been going on for nearly six months, we are still unable to switch over to the discussion of other questions of interest to both parties, but to gradually reach a fair political settlement of the Viet Nam problem. The U.S. side is responsible for such a state of things. U.S. authorities, especially President Johnson, have repeatedly clamored about the so-called efforts of the United States towards an 'honorable' peace with a view to soothing the rising anti-war movement in the United States, deceiving U.S. voters at the eve of the presidential elections, and, at the same time, appealing the

that:

—The United States government pretends to end to its use of aggressive forces against Viet Nam and definitely abstain from all encroachments on the sovereignty and security of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam;

—All American and satellite troops be withdrawn from South Viet Nam;

—The internal affairs of the South be settled by the Southern people themselves in accordance with the Political Programme of the South Viet Nam National Front for Liberation, without foreign interference;

—The reunification of Viet Nam be attended to by the people of the two zones, South and North, free from foreign intervention.

Dear fellow-countrymen and fighters,

ANY hardships and sacrifices still lie ahead of us, but our people's great resistance against American aggression, for national salvation, is progressing at a brisk pace toward victory. The trumpet call of the Fatherland is firing us forward to crush American aggressors completely, at heart.

The American imperialists will certainly be defeated!

Our people will undoubtedly win!

November 3, 1968

ever growing indignation of the peace-loving people in the world.

"As President Johnson was talking peace, Western news agencies reported that the number of U.S. air raids against North Viet Nam reached the highest level since June. In two days alone, Oct. 28 and 29, 1968, U.S. B-52's flew 6 carpet-bombing sorties, releasing as many as 700 tons of bombs over the Vinh Linh area, north of the Demilitarized Zone. In South Viet Nam, the U.S. goes on intensifying its sweeps, even in the Demilitarized Zone. U.S. aircraft continue their indiscriminate bombings against so-called 'suspected' areas in accordance with the Political Programme of the South Viet Nam National Front for Liberation, without any foreign interference.

To reach a fair political settlement of the Viet Nam problem, the U.S. Government should renounce all schemes for intervention and aggression against Viet Nam and respect the Vietnamese people's fundamental national rights. So long as the United States persists in its aggression against Viet Nam, the Vietnamese people will fight on till total victory.

The Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam warmly commends the people throughout the country who, united as one man, are standing by the South Viet Nam National Front for Liberation in the face of aggression, and to pursue its neo-colonial policy in South Viet Nam."

# STORY OF THE HEROIC LAND

(Continued from page 1)

the world and of progressive people in the United States as well.

After the unconditional ending of U.S. bombardments on the entire territory of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam, the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam will discuss with the U.S. side "other problems of concern to the two sides" with a view to a political solution to the Viet Nam problem. In agreement with the Central Committee of the South Viet Nam National Front for Liberation, the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam ensures its readiness to participate in a conference whose attendance will comprise representatives of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam, the South Viet Nam National Front for Liberation, the United States and the Saigon administration. The Saigon administration's attendance at the said conference does not involve recognition of that regime by the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam.

The South Viet Nam National Front for Liberation is the organizer and leader of the South Vietnamese people in the struggle against U.S. aggression, for national salvation. It has liberated four-fifths of the South Viet Nam territory with more than ten million population; it possesses powerful armed forces, and its great prestige at home and abroad. As genuine representative of the South Vietnamese people, the South Viet Nam National Front for Liberation is the only instrument which the U.S. imperialist aggressors are using to implement neo-colonialism in South Viet Nam. It is pursuing a policy which clashes with all legitimate aspirations of the South Vietnamese people. It represents nobody.

The position of the Vietnamese people on a settlement of the Viet Nam problem has been made plain in the four points of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam and the Political Programme of the South Viet Nam National Front for Liberation. It is an independence and peace stand, consistent with the fundamental principles of the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Viet Nam. The Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam and the Vietnamese people insistently demand that the United States stop the war of aggression in Viet Nam, put a halt to all encroachments on the sovereignty and security of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam, and withdraw all U.S. and satellite troops from South Viet Nam, U.S. military bases there, and let the South Vietnamese people settle themselves their own affairs in accordance with the Political Programme of the South Viet Nam National Front for Liberation, without any foreign interference.

To reach a fair political settlement of the Viet Nam problem, the U.S. Government should renounce all schemes for intervention and aggression against Viet Nam and respect the Vietnamese people's fundamental national rights. So long as the United States persists in its aggression against Viet Nam, the Vietnamese people will fight on till total victory.

The Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam calls on the brother and friends all over the world to continue to give their support and assistance to the Vietnamese people toward total victory, to take firm actions for ending U.S. aggression against Viet Nam, to all U.S. encroachments on the sovereignty and security of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam, for the withdrawal of all U.S. and satellite troops from South Viet Nam, removal of all U.S. military bases there, and for the respect of the South Vietnamese people's right to settle themselves their own affairs in accordance with the Political Programme of the South Viet Nam National Front for Liberation, without any foreign interference.

The Vietnamese people will surely be victorious!

The U.S. imperialist aggressors will inevitably be defeated!

Long live a peaceful, united, independent, Democratic and prosperous Viet Nam!

had to, unconditionally halt the bombardments on the whole territory of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam represents a tremendous victory, but it is only a temporary reprieve. The U.S. aggression, for national salvation, will continue to grow in proportion to their failure. They must be thwarted North Viet Nam, stopping up their aggression against South Viet Nam and daily committing new crimes against our Southern fellow-countrymen. The Vietnamese people as a whole are resolved to strengthen their unity, heighten their vigilance, overcome all hardships, make every sacrifice, fight and defeat the enemy in response to the appeal of President Ho Chi Minh and that of the Central Committee of the South Viet Nam National Front for Liberation, the United States and the Saigon administration. The Saigon administration's attendance at the said conference does not involve recognition of that regime by the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam.

Let the armed forces and people of North Viet Nam uphold their glorious fighting tradition, stand ready to take all schemes of the U.S. imperialists against the North, and bend all their energies to fulfill the obligations as the great war area toward the great front, so that we can live up to the role as a revolutionary base of the entire country!

Let our heroic South Vietnamese people continue to raise higher their winning position and their position of strength in the current struggle. Let the U.S. imperialist aggressors be unflinchingly fight until complete victory, build an independent, peaceful, united, neutral and prosperous South Viet Nam, and ultimately realize peaceful national reunification!

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To reach a fair political settlement of the Viet Nam problem, the U.S. Government should renounce all schemes for intervention and aggression against Viet Nam and respect the Vietnamese people's fundamental national rights. So long as the United States persists in its aggression against Viet Nam, the Vietnamese people will fight on till total victory.

The Vietnamese people will surely be victorious!

The U.S. imperialist aggressors will inevitably be defeated!

Long live a peaceful, united, independent, Democratic and prosperous Viet Nam!

Hanoi, November 2, 1968

# Heroic Land

Editor's Note. — By October 21, 1968, the armed forces and people of Quang Binh had shot down 563 American aircraft, 100 of which were downed by the military in the Quang Binh report. Never Sink talks about the life and struggle of the peasants of a village in that heroic province.

COMRADE Ngai, head of the administrative committee of V. village, who was walking about the bent down every few steps to pick up a bomb splinter which he pointed to the French here. And over there, near the bridge, were dropped every few hours on the same places. Sometimes, leaflets were dropped: rectangular pieces of paper on which were printed the names of U.S. aircraft of all types: B-57, B-52, B-70, B-72, B-73, B-74, B-75, B-76, B-77, B-78, B-79, B-80, B-81, B-82, B-83, B-84, B-85, B-86, B-87, B-88, B-89, B-90, B-91, B-92, B-93, B-94, B-95, B-96, B-97, B-98, B-99, B-100, B-101, B-102, B-103, B-104, B-105, B-106, B-107, B-108, B-109, B-110, B-111, B-112, B-113, B-114, B-115, B-116, B-117, B-118, B-119, B-120, B-121, B-122, B-123, B-124, B-125, B-126, B-127, B-128, B-129, B-130, B-131, B-132, B-133, B-134, B-135, B-136, B-137, B-138, B-139, B-140, B-141, B-142, B-143, B-144, B-145, B-146, B-147, B-148, B-149, B-150, B-151, B-152, B-153, B-154, B-155, B-156, B-157, B-158, B-159, B-160, B-161, B-162, B-163, B-164, B-165, B-166, B-167, B-168, B-169, B-170, B-171, B-172, B-173, B-174, B-175, B-176, B-177, B-178, B-179, B-180, B-181, B-182, B-183, B-184, B-185, B-186, B-187, B-188, B-189, B-190, B-191, B-192, B-193, B-194, B-195, B-196, B-197, 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# TOTAL VALUE OF U.S. "CLEAR-AND-HOLD" STRATEGIC PATENT SETBACK

## A PATENT STRATEGIC SETBACK

A few weeks after the staggering blow dealt by the P.L.A.F. in their "T" offensive, the men in the Pentagon sent on March 25, 1968, to L.B. Johnson, reported the Paris *Pigeon*, a plan aimed at replacing the "search-and-destroy" strategy by the "clear-and-hold" strategy, a more modest plan which consists in mustering forces to defend the most populated areas in South Viet Nam. It transpires that the P.L.A.F. admitted that the bulk of the U.S. and puppet armies had been engaged in operations aimed at "stations" and "out offensives" of the South Viet Nam N.F.L. Their task boils down to the following:

First, avoid for the U.S. expeditionary forces new substantial losses and enable them to keep their role as mainstay of the aggressive military forces in South Viet Nam.

Second, save the puppet army and administration from total collapse and try with might and main to set about a puppet army which, as Washington hopes, would be able to bear the brunt of the war.

Third, keep the strategic positions necessary to the continuation of the war, those which are, at the present time, of vital importance to the U.S. expeditionary forces, towns and cities, bases, trunk communication lines and a few populated rural areas still under their control.

As is obvious to everyone in the American press, the Pentagon has recognized it — this strategic plan is an emergency plan, it is not the worst, but the best, the only way to avoid the sweeping down of the South Viet Nam armed forces and people. The American imperialists are determined to obtain this "new strategy," only "limited success," that is to prevent the desperate defensive struggle. Gone the period, still quite recent, in which the Americans, along like conquerors at the head of hundreds of thousands of G.I.s, donning their spick and span uniforms, armed with the most modern equipment and having a matchless firing power, Westmoreland trumpeted that he would "break the V.C.'s backbone" with his "search-and-destroy" strategy.

The strategy of his successor in Saigon is a real step backward and reflects the loss of muscle and presence of the U.S. aggressors.

Since then, developments on the battlefield have given substance to P.L.A.F. predictions in its various communiqués released after the lunar new year that the successes expected by Abrams and his bosses are sheer moonshine for the U.S. army.

## INABILITY OF THE ENEMY TO CARRY OUT STRATEGIC DEFENSIVE

N his inspection tour of South Viet Nam, Clark Clifford, Naamara's successor, Mr. Clifford, admitted that the bulk of the U.S. and puppet armies had been engaged in operations aimed at "stations" and "out offensives" of the South Viet Nam N.F.L. Their task boils down to the following:

First, defend and consolidate the reinforced defense lines around and within towns and cities, military bases, important C.P.s and "enclaves" setting up strategic communication lines.

Second, set up "belts" capable of resisting the pressure of the enemy and to drive the way away from cities and towns of paramount political and military importance for the U.S. and qualings.

Third, conduct police operations in cities and towns and "sweeping" clear towns and communication lines and prevent P.L.A.F. attacks.

It is obvious to all observers that an insoluble contradiction has arisen between the Pentagon's "new" strategic plan and the quite inadequate troop strength at the disposal of the U.S. command in Saigon.

Two-thirds of enemy forces had to be concentrated around the cities and towns, the most important provinces of South Viet Nam. Nevertheless, the Pentagon's "new" strategy "nor the old" imperial capital and the marines south of the 17th parallel have been able to parry the hard blows of the P.L.A.F. since last spring. The "new" strategy, which is based on the calculations of some American strategic services, a somewhat "solid" defense of the Saigon would require half a million men! And what about other centres and bases all over the country?

In order to make good this "new" strategy, the only way the Pentagon dares to think of is an "enclave" strategy, the expeditionary corps coupled with great efforts to maintain the muscle and presence of the puppet army.

However, the time is over when Johnson could throw tens of thousands of G.I.s into the battle within a few months! The bellicose president can now reinforce only piecemeal the U.S. expeditionary corps, which well-nigh reaches the ceiling of some 550,000 men. This possibility to beef up the strength of the puppet army is also desirous in the present military and political situation when the areas under enemy control have considerably shrunk and the puppet administrative apparatus is facing critical disintegration.

Enemy losses have skyrocketed, reaching a daily average of 1,000 killed, wounded, captured or reported as "deserters" according to the P.L.A.F. latest communiqué (No 10), thus exceeding by far the 1967 figures. Clifford admitted that the losses in the monthly American casualties in 1968 equalled the highest figures in 1967.

This is a problem familiar to all primary schoolchildren: it is useless to try to fill a hole with a bucket, it is a flow superior to the supplying tap.

Some one would say that the victories of the last year depend chiefly on the fighting spirit of its troops and on a good command and organization. This is quite true, but this is precisely the chink in the enemy armor.

According to the Western press, the morale of the puppet army is as low as... a blade of grass. That of the G.I.s is no higher. The underlying cause of all this is the loss of the U.S. command in the enemy soldiers have been compelled to wage against a hardened and well-armed people, resolute to fight and sure to win.

The P.L.A.F. is waging war for the aggressors! As for the organization of the puppet army, it is a disaster. Profound changes due to personal rivalries between various clans in the Saigon-Nam Bo where they are used in the occupation of the various towns and C.P.s, communication lines, rural areas, in the formation of "units" by the American staff officers in Saigon had not been able to halt the P.L.A.F. attacks and big contingents of troops were necessary to the Pentagon and the White House. Its implementation has exposed its many weaknesses and it is doubtful that under the impact of the onslaught of the South Viet Nam P.L.A.F., the puppet army will, like its predecessors, meet with its doom.

Police and clearing operations have yielded no better results. The enemy continues to expand its urban centres, even in Saigon and the puppet army convoys are being destroyed on roads and highways, and shells are raining on American bases.

While almost all his troop strength has been committed to "hold" so numerous positions, that amount of troops is left for Saigon to carry out "sweeps" of any important centres, the enemy armed forces, already powerless

to launch counter-offensives, have to carry out strategic defence.

## A STRATEGIC SET-UP WITH MANY WEAKNESSES AND SHORTCOMINGS

IMPLEMENTING his "clear-and-hold" strategy, Abrams has concentrated his forces around towns and cities, communication lines and populated rural areas to cope with the people's attacks and uprisings. He planned to create a situation enabling him to put up a strong defensive posture while in a position to launch heavy attacks at a moment's notice, drive the way away from the defence zones and put an end to the scattering of his forces.

However, events have shown that none of his calculations has worked. His forces remain scattered, contradictions between concentration and dispersion are still serious and the disposition of troops is full of "weaknesses" and shortcomings.

First, the targets to defend which number some hundreds are spread all over the country on a thousand kilometres from North to South. Then, even in the focal sector of this disposition where the U.S. command is stationed, the U.S. command is forced to scatter them in order to defend many objectives (military, political, administrative and economic organs) against eventual attacks with tanks from all directions, to try to interdict the main arteries, utilized by the enemy, and to discharge a "host of different missions" assigned by the situation ("patrol, guard, "sweep, control..."). Thus, of one hundred battalions stationed around Saigon two-thirds are deployed in 11 provinces of the Saigon-Nam Bo where they are used in the occupation of the various towns and C.P.s, communication lines, rural areas, in the formation of "units" by the American staff officers in Saigon had not been able to halt the P.L.A.F. attacks and big contingents of troops were necessary to the Pentagon and the White House. Its implementation has exposed its many weaknesses and it is doubtful that under the impact of the onslaught of the South Viet Nam P.L.A.F., the puppet army will, like its predecessors, meet with its doom.

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incapability to create a great mobile force capable of coping with the revolutionary forces strikes against the most threatened positions in his defective system. His thin stratum of troops is now decimated by the P.L.A.F. and the weaknesses of his strategy are increased. And all this are the constant modifications in his dispositions while regions in the South Viet Nam and cities were barbarously hit. Nearly all the villages and hamlets in Can Lo district, on Highway No. 9, near the 17th parallel, have been flattened and Da Nang around Saigon and Da Nang were flattened into "safety belts" for the U.S. and qualings. Hue, one of the biggest cities in South Viet Nam, had, according to the Western press, 80 per cent of its houses destroyed by American bombs and shells. This have wrought havoc on the life of the city and is an open avowal of the bankruptcy of the demagogic political theories of U.S. neo-colonialism. It is also a sign of the most exacerbated contradiction inherent in the "clear-and-hold" strategy, between the military measures and the conduct of the war on the one hand, and the most urgent political objective of the aggressors on the other, that of stability — however apparent they may be — which must be created, and the failure of the latter, which no puppet regime could be viable.

The enemy is once more mistaken in thinking that the South Viet Nam people. The past and present have shown that it is in the midst of the harshest repression that the revolution comes to land in the country. Wholesale destruction and massacre weapons used by the U.S. military actions as was shown by the case of Khe Sanh, the most famous of them, whose pitiful fate heralded the bankruptcy of this American tactics. "Mobile defence" exists only in the minds of the American officers; in fact, there is on the terrain a classical "static defence" as remarked by a correspondent on July 3 last. The "belts" around Saigon, Hue, Da Nang and the puppet army with their tanks, electronic watchtowers etc., are but a classic type of static defence.

Abrams has ballyhooed his fire power, claiming, as circled Johnson did, that his B-52s could "blast" the enemy into the sea. On June 20, 1968, he ordered a "sweep" of the area around Saigon two-thirds are deployed in 11 provinces of the Saigon-Nam Bo where they are used in the occupation of the various towns and C.P.s, communication lines, rural areas, in the formation of "units" by the American staff officers in Saigon had not been able to halt the P.L.A.F. attacks and big contingents of troops were necessary to the Pentagon and the White House. Its implementation has exposed its many weaknesses and it is doubtful that under the impact of the onslaught of the South Viet Nam P.L.A.F., the puppet army will, like its predecessors, meet with its doom.

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## U.S. CONDUCT OF THE WAR AND ITS POLITICAL AIMS ARE IRRECONCILABLE

ONE of the salient features in the war now being waged by the Americans is massive utilization of bombs, rockets and toxic chemicals to destroy whole regions in the South Viet Nam and cities were barbarously hit. Nearly all the villages and hamlets in Can Lo district, on Highway No. 9, near the 17th parallel, have been flattened and Da Nang around Saigon and Da Nang were flattened into "safety belts" for the U.S. and qualings. Hue, one of the biggest cities in South Viet Nam, had, according to the Western press, 80 per cent of its houses destroyed by American bombs and shells. This have wrought havoc on the life of the city and is an open avowal of the bankruptcy of the demagogic political theories of U.S. neo-colonialism. It is also a sign of the most exacerbated contradiction inherent in the "clear-and-hold" strategy, between the military measures and the conduct of the war on the one hand, and the most urgent political objective of the aggressors on the other, that of stability — however apparent they may be — which must be created, and the failure of the latter, which no puppet regime could be viable.

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## 15 YEARS OF GLORIOUS SUCCESSES

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# ON THE LARGE SOUTHERN FRONT

## Military Operations

### 4TH ARMY WITH VIET NAM GUERRILLA WARFARE ENDS SUCCESS

In the small hours of November 1, the P.L.A.F. shelled many targets in downtown Saigon — Cho Lon, in Hue, and My Tho. Moored on the Mekong river, opposite My Tho, an L.S.T. with 400 G.I.s on board was blasted by mines and suffered heavy damage. Tan Son Nhut airbase and the fuel depots at Nha Be were plastered with big shells.

Nevertheless the activities of regional troops and guerrillas were given full prominence in last week's South Viet Nam military reports of the Gai Phong Press Agency. In the present revolutionary armed struggle of the South Vietnamese people against the American aggressors and their lackeys "guerrilla warfare" prevails indeed in military actions of the patriotic forces and largely contributes to the success of their arms. There lies the great significance of the Guerrilla Warfare Conference which ended in mid-October.

WESTERN press revealed that a little past midnight of Nov. 1 the P.L.A.F. slammed shells on Saigon — Cho Lon. The targets hit were Gia Lon police, seat of the puppet "government" and the Fifth District Police C.P. North West of the city, Tan Son Nhut airbase, and the fuel port of Nha Be to the Southeast. Military trucks, tanks and fuel tanks were hit. Meanwhile, on the banks of the main arm of the Mekong river, at Tan Thoi, 60km from Saigon, a puppet military post reportedly received 35 shells while an L.S.T. landing craft with 400 G.I.s on board was blasted by mines. The ship, 177 metres long, used as floating base for U.S. mobile troops in the Mekong Delta, was seriously damaged. At least 47 G.I.s packed in their cabins were killed, wounded or reported "missing" and the ship was partly under water.

In Hue, at least about 15 shells fell on an enemy post on the night of Oct. 31. Western agencies announced.

THE fiercest ground battles took place between October 26 and 28 in Tay Ninh province where an American battalion had one company wiped out and two others badly mauled in Tang Ken region (50km northeast of Tay Ninh). At least two companies were perished. Further south, in Ben Cat region, 45km north of Saigon, 183 enemy troops were killed or wounded, 5 tanks and armoured cars destroyed and 2 choppers downed between October 24 and 29.

In Ben Tre province, Mekong Delta, between October 19 and 25, some elements of U.S. Division 9 and puppet troops suffered a new setback in Quang Trom and Mo Cay districts and lost 500 men put out of action, 17 vessels sunk or burnt and 12 helicopters downed. In Tra Vinh and Rach Gia provinces, heavy losses were respectively 400 men wiped out, 6 vessels sunk or set afire, 2 choppers downed and 3 vehicles

destroyed between October 1 and 5, and 450 men put out of action (including 100 men who crossed over to our side), 2 choppers downed and 4 war vessels sunk between October 1 and 10.

Among other targets of the P.L.A.F. in Nam Bo were: Ba Trua base, 100km from the Long Binh logistic complex, north of Saigon (October 20), Ka Tum camp, 100km northwest of Saigon (October 26) and 9 sector and sub-sector C.P.s (October 23-29).

In the Western High Plateaux, the P.L.A.F. pounded Sar Pa post near Duc Lap (October 23), a U.S. artillery position northwest of Kon Tum (October 26), a battalion of U.S. Division 4, 80km south of Pleiku and another position near Dak To (October 26), base of U.S. para Brigade 173 at An Khe (October 30). The losses of the enemy in the ambushes along the guerrillas and regional troops on the roads linking this region to the coastal areas or across the Western High Plateaux from North to South (from October 10 to 15) were 210 casualties, 28 vehicles destroyed including 8 tanks and armoured cars and 2 choppers downed.

North of Quang Tri province, the U.S. Marine unit of U.S. Marine Division 5 newly landed in South Viet Nam were violently intercepted in Con Tru region from October 23 to 26 and lost at least 300 men and over a dozen armoured vehicles. Near Con Viet port, on October 24 to 27, three LCU landing craft were sunk, blocking navigation on the canal for several days.

Between October 1 and 8, the guerrillas put out of action 400 enemy troops (mostly G.I.s) around Hue, and killed and wounded 400 G.I.s engaged in clearing operations south of Quang Tri province.

Southwest of Da Nang, on October 29, P.L.A.F. artillery pounded Traung Duc outpost twice.

In mid-October 1968, the 4th All-South Viet Nam Guerrilla Conference was held somewhere in South Nam's liberated zone.

Miss Nguyen Thi Dinh, deputy C-in-C of the People's Liberation Armed Forces, delivered a report on the military situation and splendid exploits of guerrilla warfare, the highlights of which are as follows:

Over the past period, our armed forces and people have obtained unprecedentedly great and all-sided successes. Guerrilla warfare has contributed its substantial share to such brilliant results. It has gone through a new, vigorous and diverse development. It has encircled, attacked, decimated, wiped out a great amount of manpower and war means; it has particularly swept away enemy agents, spies and thugs at the grass-roots level, stretched the enemy thin, pinned them down, encircled them and pressured them and effectively helped the masses to rise up and seize power. It has organized broad masses of people from various nationalities, religious confessions, all walks of life in the towns, the countryside and mountain

areas. It has in particular brought into full play the role of women. Many elderly people and children have also volunteered for the fighting. Three combat forces — guerrillas, militia and armed masses — have come into being. This aggregate strength has constantly increased the capacity of guerrilla warfare of decimating and wiping out the enemy, and of launching vigorous and generalized attacks throughout South Viet Nam.

Guerrilla warfare has powerfully developed in nearly all towns, cities, townships providing fresh facilities for its own growth and consolidation and for its extension and sustained actions in the very U.S. puppet last dens, thus giving rise everywhere to keep-up generalized offensives and uprisings.

Together with the uprisings of the masses, and of puppet militarymen, it has brought about a situation in which the enemy is encircled, and is under attack in temporarily occupied rural areas. It has given a strong impetus to armed uprisings, enlarged large rural areas, enlarged our rear base,

and made it possible to mobilize more manpower and resources to serve the front.

The conference offered an opportunity for exchanges of valuable experiences on the organization and launching of guerrilla warfare. It heard special reports on guerrilla activities in Saigon, Cholon, Gia Dinh, Thua Thien, Ben Tre, Tra Vinh, Loc Ninh, Cu Chi, Duc Hoa, Binh Phu, Binh Duc, ... It cited three of the South Viet Nam guerrilla movement which were afterwards commended by the High Command of the P.L.A.F.:

1) Ben Tre, for its gallant simultaneous uprisings, victories over U.S. aggressors and its achievements in wiping out puppet troops and civil servants.

2) Tra Vinh, for its widespread uprisings, its perfectly coordinated team work in the accomplishment of exploits.

3) Thua Thien, for its heroic sustained offensives and uprisings.

## NEW PROGRESS IN LIBERATED AREAS

### THE PEOPLE ELECT THEIR OWN ADMINISTRATION

AS the puppet administration is collapsing and the people and armed forces of the South are keeping up their tempestuous attacks begun at Tet, the people in the liberated areas of South Viet Nam are zealously building up their own revolutionary administration, first of all by electing the People's Liberation Councils and People's Liberation Committees at all levels — village, district and province — through universal suffrage.

In the former stage of self-management the people of the South had already begun to a certain extent to exercise their right as masters of their own life and destiny. Relations among the people and the needs of their life and struggle were regulated in accordance with local customs and mores and regulations worked out at popular meetings. But then the liberated areas expanded and joined together into immense stretches.

But then the liberated areas expanded and joined together into immense stretches. The centralized power to be set up, i.e. People's Liberation Councils and People's Liberation Committees, elected through universal suffrage, aimed at concentrating all

will, all energies and adequately meeting the immense complex and urgent needs of combat, production and everyday life. Those Councils and Committees are to be specialized agencies having a firm grasp of the situation, of revolutionary policies, of immediate and future requirements, in which ideas were set forth, discussions held and resolutions and plans elaborated, so that activities in all fields may be coordinated, the people in the village, district, or province provided with uniform guidance and their strength combined. Progress then could take place in keeping with the tempo and needs of the whole region, the liberated areas ever more consolidated, and the revolution advance faster towards victory.

Conscious of the usefulness of the building of revolutionary power, which will still further promote their right as masters of their own destiny, the people of the South have carefully participated in the elections at all levels, old folks, blind and weak-sighted people, and even asked their children to help them to polling booths and urged all their relatives and friends to do so. Many said: "Today power is verily in our hands. We must pool and

bend our efforts to organize with greater efficiency the fighting, production, and our life so as to / serve the front better and safeguard our own power." Others said: "Each ballot cast is a bullet fired at the American aggressors and their lackeys."

The elections did not come off without difficulties and hardships. Enemy bombings, shelling and sweeps in many cases stained the voting papers with blood. But the people of the South resolutely surged forward, "trampling on the enemy's heads," to elect their revolutionary administration. During the election campaign and the voting, the task of building up the revolutionary administration was intimately wedded to that of fighting the enemy and defending the liberated areas. In Kien Giang, Tay Ninh, Binh Thuan, etc. for instance, in spite of intensified enemy actions and the floods, the people held their elections. The counter-raids were staged against the enemy. In many villages in Quang Nam and Ben Tre, enemy raids were launched on polling day. The guerrillas and the people, after finishing the enemy away, went on with their voting. In the Tay Nguyen, the returned

(Continued page 7)